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Abstract 
This study examined the potential interactions between human trust and human trust of 
automation on outcomes such as attribution of credit and blame, trust in partner, trust in 
automation, team performance, and perception of reliability. Using a micro-world computer 
program called Networked Fire Chief, 186 participants in 93 teams were assessed on a variety of 
outcomes, including attribution of blame for errors and credit for success, trust in their human 
partner, trust in the automation, perceptions of the reliability of the automation, and performance 
of the team. These teams were comprised of either teams of friends or teams of strangers to 
compare levels of human trust, and experienced either 100% reliable automation or 70% reliable 
automation. Results showed that individuals blamed themselves for mistakes less when they 
were in the 100% reliable automation condition, and that there was a three-way interaction of 
human trust, reliability of the automation, and perfect automation schema (PAS) on the 
perception of the reliability of the automation. The relationship of the variables with PAS 
changed depending on whether the participants were in Matched Trust or Mixed Trust 
environments, suggesting context incorporating human trust characteristics is important for 
automation research going forward. Implications of these findings are explored, as well as 
possible future directions.
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The use of automation is becoming increasingly prevalent both in everyday life and in the 
workplace. From global positioning systems (GPS) to autopilots to cybersecurity, automation is 
not only increasing in use but also in complexity. Automation is technology that actively selects 
data, transforms information, makes decisions, or controls processes (Lee & See, 2004). It can 
enable new ways of completing tasks, create new roles for humans, and can drastically change 
the way certain occupations conduct their jobs (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000; 
Woods, 1996). Complexity of these automation systems are greatly varied, as are their tasks and 
responsibilities. The amount of human control and interactions with automation differs widely, 
ranging from total automation of a system to more manual human-controlled systems (Sheridan, 
1992). But what all automation shares, no matter what configuration or complexity, is that it 
wields the power of technology to either make us very intelligent or very stupid (Norman, 1993). 
Determining how to best utilize automation for the accomplishment of goals is important for 
present-day society and also for planning future intelligent uses of automation.  
This thesis will explore one aspect within the human-automation relationship, specifically 
how the relationships between humans as well as interactions between humans and automation 
(H-HA) can influence one another. Sociotechnical systems comprised of both humans and 
automation are increasingly in use across a wide variety of jobs and environments. Automation is 
becoming less of an occasional tool and more of a regular partner, and planning for increased 
levels of interactions needs to begin now. For example, nuclear power plants utilize large teams 
of humans and automation, and the first space flight mission to Mars will involve a highly 
complex combination of technological systems and highly specialized human operators within a 
dangerous and unforgiving environment (Baker & Keebler, 2017). Gaining a better 
understanding of these complex systems function can best position both the Mars mission and 
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more common H-HA teams to be as efficient and productive as possible while avoiding negative 
consequences to themselves and others. Even today within the field of Industrial Organizational 
Psychology, automation and automated decision aids are used in increasing numbers. IBM’s 
Watson is just one example of an automated decision tool used within a larger human team 
context. 
The Construct of Trust 
Using automation to its fullest potential requires what can be considered development of 
a relationship between the automation system and its human operator. To begin with, properly 
using automation requires an appropriate amount of human trust in the technology (Hoff & 
Bashir, 2015; Lewandowsky, Mundy & Tan, 2000). However, it is important to first consider 
trust at the broad human level in order to understand how it manifests similarly and yet 
differently in any relationship with automation.  
Trust is defined as the willingness to accept vulnerability to the actions of another party 
based on positive expectations of their attributes, (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). Trust is a 
necessary element within work organizations, as the presence or absence of trust can influence a 
multitude of important outcomes. The construct of trust also exists within all levels of an 
organization; between and among coworkers, within teams, and as regards trust in the 
organization itself (Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007). 
There are many components that make up trust and influence how it develops. Timing of 
trust, from its initial inception between two individuals to long term maintenance, can fluctuate 
or remain static depending on a number of factors. Trust can begin in any number of 
environments between individuals and at different levels depending on the personality 
characteristics of the individuals and the rules and norms of the environment (Lewicki, 
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Tomlinson, & Gillespie, 2006; Lewicki & Wiethoff, 2000). Some researchers argue that trust 
begins at zero, while others argue that a baseline of moderate to high initial trust is likely given 
certain personality and environmental characteristics (Jones & George, 1998; Kramer, 1994). 
Indeed, two students interacting in a lab environment under the guidance of a researcher may 
promote a sense of safety and that it is okay to risk trusting a stranger who shares a similar 
background as a fellow student. One would expect higher-than-average trust between these 
students than between two strangers off the street. Additionally, the evolution of trust is based 
largely on the development of favorable attitudes and expectations through behavioral 
interactions (Jones & George, 1998). The constructs of conditional and unconditional trust can 
be used to reflect this -- conditional trust relying on continued expected behavior while 
unconditional trust is based in assured trustworthiness and confidence from repeated and longer-
term behavioral interactions (Butler, 1983; Jones & George, 1998). Trusting bonds between 
individuals, given the right circumstances, can become stronger and more significant over time, 
the common definition of a friend being someone who is both known and trusted (Barney & 
Hansen, 1994; Li, Eden, Hitt, & Ireland, 2008). 
Dispositional qualities of a person at the beginning of a human-human relationship can 
impact the development and strength of trust. For example, propensity to trust has been identified 
as a stable personality characteristic where an individual has a tendency to either trust or be 
suspicious of others (Mayer et al., 1995; Rotter, 1980). Long-term implications of one’s 
propensity to trust can affect relationships, even after initial beginnings of the relationship, and 
this impact can be seen for both lower and higher values of propensity to trust (Van Dyne, 
Vandewalle, Kostova, Latham, & Cummings, 2000). Propensity to trust influences how someone 
sees other’s motives and behaviors, in that people who rank lower on propensity to trust tend to 
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skeptical or cynical while those who rank higher on propensity to trust will have a higher 
expectation of a partner’s trustworthiness. The point at which one’s propensity to trust becomes a 
stronger influencer of one’s trust of others is contested, but what is known is that trust is a 
complicated construct determined by many underlying influences and experiences with no one 
clear driving force (Yakovleva, Reilly, & Werko, 2010).Trust has also been described as an 
attitude, where it evolves with the developing relationship based on prior behaviors and past 
experiences (Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985). Thus, it becomes clear that trust does not occur 
in a vacuum, but rather is, in part, the product of stable personality characteristics, but also 
pertains to one’s relationship to particular others one’s and may change based on dynamic 
interactions with others. 
Depending on the length of a human relationship, different components of trust can take 
on unique forms. Trust is frequently described as a culmination of three contributing 
components: 1) ability, 2) benevolence, and 3) integrity (Mayer et al., 1995). Figure 1 illustrates 
these three components of trust. 
Ability, the first component of trust according to Mayer et al. (1995), is the group of 
skills, competencies, and characteristics that enable the capability to have influence within a 
specific area (Mayer et al., 1995). Depending on the entity being trusted, one may perceive the 
trustee as either having or not having the capacity to complete tasks or situation-specific 
responsibilities. This construct has been called other names, such as competence or perceived 
expertise, but on any case this element of the trustee’s ability or expertness is a key contributing 
factor of trust (Butler Jr, 1991; Butler Jr & Cantrell, 1984; Giffin, 1967). 
Benevolence, the second component of trust according to Mayer et al. (1995), describes 
the extent to which the trustor believes the trustee will want to do good to them (Mayer et al., 
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1995). This reflects an attachment to the beginnings of an almost altruistic loyalty to the 
relationship. This benevolence has also been described as positive intentions or motives believed 
by the trustor to belong to the trustee (Mishra & Morrissey, 1990; Schoorman et al., 2007). 
Integrity, the third and last component of trust according to Mayer et al. (1995), describes 
the trustor’s perception that the trustee follows a set of moral guidelines the trustor finds 
acceptable (Schoorman et al., 2007). Consistency of the trustee’s actions, credible 
communication about the trustee from the trustor’s perspective, and how aligned the trustee’s 
actions and words are can all factor into the trustor’s overall perception of a trustee’s integrity 
(Mayer et al., 1995). 
These three components of trust (Mayer et al., 1995) and their interrelationship can vary 
depending on length of a person-to-person relationship. For example, relationships that have 
existed for a shorter length of time show a stronger correlation between benevolence and 
integrity. It takes more time to test any assertions about the other person’s benevolence and be 
able to separate integrity and benevolence (Schoorman et al., 2007). Thus, depending on if and 
when one places trust between individuals under a microscope, trust can take on different forms 
and predict different outcomes across the lifespan of the relationship. 
Trust amongst peers within an organization has been found to predict the likelihood of 
information sharing, cooperation, and performance within workgroups, as well as act as 
mediators and moderators for burnout, stress, and turnover (Dirks & Ferrin, 2001; Mayer et al., 
1995).  Thus, in order for an organization to be successful and considerate of employee needs, 
trust within all levels of an organization deserves careful attention. Trust at the individual level 
can have large impacts on organizational trust and outcomes, and prevailing attitudes about trust 
in the organization can also influence trust amongst individuals (Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012; 
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Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998; Schoorman et al., 2007). Trust is not only dynamic 
between individuals, but it is clearly dynamic across levels and mediums. Based on how trust is 
described here and in the literature, the next questions become clear: Is trust in nonhuman 
entities similarly dynamic? And, is trust amongst individual humans and trust in nonhuman 
entities interactive in some way (or ways) as well? 
Human Trust in Automation 
Trust in automation has been studied extensively from the standpoint of human operators 
of automated systems. There are many key components influencing the development, 
maintenance, and dissolution of trust in automation, much like human-human trust. It can be 
noted that trust is an important component in both human-human relationships as well as human-
machine relationships (Muir & Moray, 1996). Reeves and Nass (1996) have found supporting 
evidence that humans respond in a social way to technology, with similar feelings and reactions 
as they would to another human. It has also been argued that trust mediates the relationship 
between human and automation much like it does between humans (Sheridan, 1975). Trust 
specifically related to automation has also been described as an attitude people have that the 
automation will help achieve an operator’s goals in a situation characterized by the human’s 
uncertainty and vulnerability (Lee & See. 2004). 
Humans appear to place trust in machines much like they place trust in humans; people 
may trust automation if it is reliable, but if let down the ensuing redevelopment of trust takes 
time, with the possibility of trust never recovering to its original level (Muir, 1988). This is 
similar to humans, in that it is very difficult for a human to regain the trust of another human 
once it is lost (Park & Judd, 1988). Lee and See (2004) postulated that trust of the automation 
from the human perspective and the actual trustworthiness of the automation ideally follow an 
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optimal linear relationship. Figure 2 illustrates this human-automation trust relationship and 
shows that user trust normally matches the trustworthiness of the system itself. This requires that 
trust in the automation is properly calibrated, meaning trust should not be higher or lower than 
what the actual capabilities of the system calls for. Calibration refers to the tuning or adjustment 
of a person’s trust in the automation based on the automation’s actual capabilities (Muir, 1987). 
Incorrect calibration of trust in automation can have drastic consequences, such as over-
trust resulting in ignoring warning signs of automation failure. There are numerous examples of 
individuals following GPS directions straight into obstacles or refusing to seek alternate 
directions until it is too late. One such incident involved a family getting lost in the height of 
summer in Death Valley for five days after refusing to accept the possibility their GPS may not 
be correctly directing them (Clark, 2011). Fatalities resulting from over-trusting automation are 
unfortunately not unheard of, and as technology becomes increasingly relied upon the 
relationship between human and automation must be better understood. Distrust of automation 
can also have dire consequences, such as not utilizing automation to its fullest potential which 
can leave the overall system underperforming and the operators overcompensating (Lee, 2006). 
Therefore, miscalibration of trust in either direction has consequences for the user, their team, 
and the overall system or organization they are part of. 
Development of Trust 
The construct of trust is complicated, and many contextual factors in combination can 
influence the development and progression of trust. For example, much like individuals may 
have a propensity to trust other humans (or not), trust of automation has also been found to be a 
dispositional difference across individuals. Trust in automation, again similar to trust among 
humans, has also been described as a fluctuating attitude that depends on three core components. 
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Trust, whether in humans or automation, is comprised of many other experiences, personality 
characteristics, and drives that make up the complete construct, but the theorized three core 
characteristics of trust are of primary interest in this research study. Whereas trust among 
humans is widely believed to be at its core made up of ability, benevolence, and integrity (Lee & 
Moray, 1992), trust in automation reflects a similar but slightly altered pattern. Lee and Moray 
(1992) identified three factors as influencing trust in automation, those being 1) performance, 2) 
process, and 3) purpose. The development and maintenance of trust in automation not only 
depends on these three components, but the interactions among them. 
Performance in the Lee and Moray 3-factor system refers to both the current and prior 
operational success of the automation. Reliability, predictability, and ability all fall under this 
umbrella (Lee & See, 2004). Actual performance of the automation and perceived performance 
of the automation forms the human user’s confidence that the automation not only has the ability 
to complete its tasks and duties, but that these outcomes are completed reliably. The probabilities 
that the automation would make a correct classification reliably and its mechanical systems act 
reliably are key components, and are covered extensively in the automation literature (Riley, 
1996). Depending on the scale of the error and the impacts it has on the user, unreliable 
automation can either quickly or gradually lose the trust of its user (Lee & See, 2004). 
The user’s evaluation of performance can also vary depending on the amount of feedback 
one receives about the automation’s reliability. Determining predictability and ability of the 
automation are also key to performance. Smith, Henning, and Smith (1995) conceptualize the 
human-automation relationship as one comprised of social tracking. Being able to anticipate the 
automation system’s actions and coordinating human activities accordingly, a form of social 
tracking that is the result of feedforward control actions on the part of human operators, helps to 
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build human trust in the automation. However, given design limitations, an automation system 
has only limited ability to similarly track human behavior and therefore automation systems 
often function as an impoverished social partner. This disparity in social tracking skills and 
abilities between the human operator and the automation system can contribute to system errors 
because human’s expectations are not in line with the automation’s capabilities (Smith et al., 
1995). Such errors will affect the development of trust and can lead to miscalibrations, either in 
the form or over-trust or under-trust. 
Process in the Lee and Moray 3-factor system refers to the appropriateness of the 
automation for the situation, and whether it is able to assist the user with their end goals (Lee & 
See, 2004). Process is more of a reflection of trust in the agent itself and the agent’s intentions, 
rather than trust in the actions or performance of the agent. Much like Sheridan (1992) describes, 
if the automation’s intentions (in the form of algorithms and coded processes) are understood by 
the user, then the user will be more likely to trust the automation. 
Purpose in the Lee and Moray 3-factor system is the degree to which the automation is 
judged as being used as the designer intended (Lee & See, 2004). The purpose of the automation 
answers the question of why the automation was developed. What was the automation designed 
to achieve? Its purpose can help communicate why the automation exists and why the user 
should consider trusting it. 
Human Trust versus Trust in Automation 
One can begin to see the parallels of human trust components and automation trust 
components. Ability, integrity, and benevolence share many similarities with performance, 
process, and purpose (see Figure 3). Ability and performance both refer to the capability of the 
human and automation to achieve goals related to the user/trustor. Integrity and process are 
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ingrained in qualities of the agent, whether human or automation. Benevolence and purpose are 
both associated with the trustor’s perceived view of the trustee’s or automation’s intentions. 
Given these very similar building blocks of trust (Hoff & Bashir, 2015; Mayer et al., 1995; 
Parasuraman et al., 2000), humans may be treating automated technology in ways more similar 
to how they would treat other humans than one would expect. This is not to say that human trust 
and trust in automation are exactly the same. Human trust is vastly more complicated given that 
automation systems lacks true conscious intentionality and complicated social needs such as 
impression management (Lee & See, 2004). However important comparisons and inferences can 
be drawn when these constructs overlap, as these behaviors and cognitive labeling can reveal 
patterns that are integral to trust as a construct. All these relationships regarding trust have 
important implications for understanding how humans interact with automated systems and in 
social contexts, which is the focus of the present research. 
Relationships regarding human trust and automation trust are complicated on their own 
but placing them into a sociotechnical systems environment containing both human teams and 
automation agents adds further complexity. Examining these relationships and their potential 
impacts is the focus of the present study. 
Human-Human and Human Automation Teams (H-HA) 
 Automation systems are becoming more common and also more complex. No longer are 
individuals solely interacting with automation systems alone, as teams of humans and multiple 
automation systems are often functioning together and interacting across many job domains. The 
example of the NASA Mars mission given earlier is only one example of a H-HA team 
consisting of human teams and automation agents. Naval submarines routinely have teams of 
submariners working together with the advanced SONAR system to establish together where 
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underwater threats are located. Robots are becoming more common in the workplace, from the 
manufacturing floors where they take leading roles in the assembly processes, to hospitals where 
they assist patients. When multiple humans and one or more automation systems all function 
together, this situation warrants special considerations and legitimate questions can be raised 
about the quality of interactions and overall effectiveness.  
Teams on their own consist of several components; they are composed of two or more 
individuals, exist to perform organizationally relevant tasks, share one or more common goals, 
interact socially, exhibit task interdependencies, and maintain and manage boundaries, 
(Kozlowski & Bell, 2003). While teams of humans have been extensively studied, as well as 
teams of teams, the new frontier of H-HA teams can be considered relatively new territory, 
especially given that the complexity of robots and automation systems is rapidly increasing, in 
part due to the addition of artificial intelligence. 
There is some evidence that people can react differently to their human or automation 
partners based on studies of decision support systems (DSS) that can serve as automated decision 
aids. Many factors influence a human’s trust of DSS systems, and this can be similar or 
dissimilar to how humans would react to other humans functioning in the same support capacity 
(Madhavan & Wiegmann, 2007). These DSS can provide information to the human about the 
task, much like a human teammate would when acting as an agent. Under these circumstances, 
automation, in general, is trusted more than humans (Dijkstra 1999; Dzindolet, Pierce, Beck, & 
Dawe, 2002). However, automation is also subject to a more rapid decline in trust by humans 
after automation errors occur than would be trust in humans functioning in the same role as the 
automation (Lerch, Prietula, & Kulik, 1997). Given these and other special considerations and 
distinctions about human versus automation trust, unexpected effects may emerge when human 
AUTOMATION AND INTERPERSONAL TRUST  12 
 
and automation agents are combined and must function like a team and gaining an understanding 
of such effects is worthy of study. 
Purpose of the Present Research 
 The present research is designed to extend our knowledge and understanding of 
automation and human interaction within sociotechnical systems by examining the dynamics of 
human and automation interactions within a team setting. Adding to what is known about human 
interactions with automation in these circumstances will benefit our understanding of how best to 
use these new technologies. The ability to predict how teams of humans will react to various 
forms of automation in different task environments, and under different social situations, could 
help us prevent serious systems failures as well as a host of other problematic aspects such as 
stress, confusion, and exhaustion experienced by those directly involved. Ensuring that team 
behavior when managing automation systems is consistent and predictable will also allow 
automation designers to better protect against user error and user misunderstandings of the 
automation. For example, if humans are more likely to accept guidance from automated systems 
over guidance from human strangers, but nonetheless will listen to human friends or trusted 
individuals more than these same automated systems, this could be problematic for 
sociotechnical systems implemented in the workplace. Sociotechnical systems consisting of H-
HA systems need to be predictable in order for trust to develop as it should and for teams to 
function at their optimal level (Klien, Woods, Bradshaw, Hoffman, & Feltovich, 2004).  
 In the present study, the strength of existing human relationships, the reliability of an 
automation system, human characteristics that influence trust, and possible interactions among 
all of these factors, are systematically examined as possible drivers of the development and 
prioritization of trust among humans and automation. Trust refers to the experimental condition 
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of teams comprised of either friends or strangers, while Reliability refers to the experimental 
condition where teams experience either 70% reliable automation or 100% reliable automation. 
Hypotheses 
Human Trust 
Human-human trust, human-machine trust, and the consequences of incorrect calibration 
of these relationships, have all been extensively studied. However, within the context of 
sociotechnical systems theory and practice there remains a gap in our understanding of how 
human-human and human-machine relationships may interact and influence one another 
regarding trust. Specifically, the research question of how an imperfect or untrustworthy 
automation system can impact trust between humans, and vice versa, has yet to be explored.  
Under attribution theory (Snead, Magal, Christensen, & Ndede-Amadi, 2015), which 
maintains there is a process by which people associate causes to events, we can begin to form a 
possible theoretical model of how trust between humans might be influenced by the reliability 
and trustworthiness of the automation system they are using. How one determines if automation 
is trustworthy can rely heavily on attribution, as individuals use their past experiences when 
forming causal attributions for outcomes (Snead et al., 2015). Related to attribution is the idea of 
assigning blame. While attribution is assigning a cause to the outcome, blame is the act of 
holding whatever caused the negative outcome to be at fault (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). 
Previous research has found that when individuals are working together on a collaborative task, 
they attribute more blame and less credit to automation than to themselves, consistent with the 
theory of self-serving bias (Groom, Chen, Johnson, Kara, & Nass, 2010; Kim & Hinds, 2006; 
You, Nie, Suh, & Sundar, 2011). Initially, most individuals strongly trust automation because 
they assume “expert” systems are better judges of information and also better at making 
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predictions. However, people are also more likely to notice errors made by automation systems 
compared to errors made by humans. While there are likely many other reasons for this 
discrepancy in error detection, according to Madhavan and Wiegmann (2007) one theory is that 
it can partially be created by mismatch between the cognitive schemas that most individuals 
initially have of automation and the automation’s actual behaviors and/or outcomes. As such, as 
automation becomes noticeably unreliable (typically near 70% reliability), attribution of cause as 
well as blame and discredit will predictably lean heavily against the automation. In the present 
study, we would predict that individuals would attribute credit and blame differently across the 
experimental conditions due to the influences of human trust and the reliability of the 
automation. Prior research has found that strangers will display the self-serving bias when 
assigning credit for success and blame for failure, while friends typically share the responsibility 
for both success and failure (Campbell, Sedikides, Reeder, & Elliot, 2000). Given the existence 
of strong positive emotions between friends, the lack of history between strangers, and the 
varying reliability of the automation causing more errors, we would expect to see more 
attributions of credit to partners in friends teams reflected in multiple ways: friends assigning 
credit to their partners and strangers assigning credit to themselves. Reliability of the automation 
can impact error rate, which can then also influence the assignment of blame or credit to the 
automation. It is possible that unforeseen interactions may occur due to the exploratory nature of 
this research, but based on prior theory the following relationships can be hypothesized: 
Hypothesis 1a: There will be an interaction between Trust and Reliability on assigned 
credit to the self, with individuals in the strangers teams and 100% reliability conditions 
assigning more credit to themselves than participants in any other experimental condition. 
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Hypothesis 1b: There will be an interaction between Trust and Reliability on assigned 
credit to partner, with individuals in the friends teams and 100% reliability conditions assigning 
more credit to their partner than any other experimental condition. 
Hypothesis 1c: There will be an interaction between Trust and Reliability on assigned 
credit to the automation, with individuals in the friends teams and 100% reliability conditions 
assigning more credit to the automation than any other experimental condition. 
Hypothesis 2a: There will be an interaction between Trust Condition and Reliability 
Condition on assigned blame to the self, with individuals in the strangers teams and 100% 
reliability conditions assigning less blame to themselves than any other experimental group. 
Hypothesis 2b: There will be an interaction between Trust and Reliability on assigned 
blame to the partner, with individuals in the friends teams and 100% reliability conditions 
assigning less blame to their partner than any other experimental condition. 
Hypothesis 2c: There will be an interaction between Trust and Reliability on assigned 
blame to the automation, with individuals in the friends teams and 70% reliability conditions 
assigning more blame to the automation than any other experimental condition. 
 
This study compares teams of friends versus teams of strangers when they are using 
either 70% reliable (the automation is correct 70% of the time) or 100% reliable automation. 
Conditions in this study utilized the 70% reliability benchmark as a way to avoid heavily biasing 
the participants against the automation when it is not functioning at 100% reliability. Given that 
prior literature has not explored H-HA teams in-depth, it is possible that differences in trust 
between humans may be impacting the calibration of trust by team members in the automation 
system, and the reliability of the automation may also interact with this calibration process. Any 
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potential influence on calibration of trust in automation by individual team members or the team 
as a whole, whether to over or under trust, is worth examining in order to prevent potential 
system failure or disaster due to incorrect use. While this study examines team performance as an 
outcome, primary concern is at the individual level. Future studies should examine more team 
level influencers and outcomes. 
Where the question of automation’s reliability affecting human relationships becomes 
much more interesting is whether strangers or individuals with established trust (manipulated 
within the present study by recruiting friends and forming them into teams) are more influenced 
by unreliable automation. This approach was adopted because trust is known to be a large 
component of friendships, and trust involves taking interpersonal risk (Warris & Rafique, 2009). 
In fact, friends have been defined as someone a person knows, likes, and trusts (Li et al., 2008). 
This is not to say that individuals do not have any form of trust in strangers. “Swift trust” is a 
type of trust that forms in temporary relationships in response to a need to manage vulnerability, 
uncertainty, and risk when everyone is equally vulnerable (Beck & Plowman, 2013). It is 
common for strangers to come together in organizations to work together in teams, and also 
common for an automation system to be used in some way by these teams. There usually is some 
amount of trust between strangers but compared to trust between friends, it is weaker and more 
fragile (Li et al., 2008). 
For those using hazardous equipment or for those who may be placed into high risk 
situations relying on imperfect automation, it may be important to know whether establishing 
trust amongst team members is an important step not only for all the benefits trust normally 
offers, but also to buffer against negative consequences of unreliable automation. Furthermore, it 
is also worth knowing if teams with individuals who trust each other treat unreliable automation 
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differently than individuals without as much human trust. Any differences in perceptions of 
automation reliability, performance, and other factors may also be important to account for. Two 
friends versus two strangers will have different amounts of trust between themselves, and this 
sociotechnical context may set up these teams to interact with said automation quite differently. 
Specifically, teams and the individuals within them may be differentially affected, or may 
perceive the automation differently as unreliable or imperfect automation, depending on their 
level of trust in their partner. For example, 73% of aviation errors are reported to happen on the 
first encounter of pilot and copilot working as an ad hoc team (National Transportation Safety 
Board, 1994). Whether error statistics like these are attributable to the automation alone, the new 
relationship alone, or represent an emergent property resulting from the combination of the 
automation and human relationships has not been examined. Initial swift trust perceptions may 
be fragile but could still have an impact on the development of long-term trust within teams, and 
so are worthy of consideration over the long term (Robert, Denis, & Hung, 2009). 
Unreliable automation and the difficulties it imposes on operators may have the spillover 
effect of influencing the relationship between individuals. Correspondingly, the fragile swift trust 
between strangers may influence the perceptions of the automation. People use their past 
experiences and current assessments of the trustee to determine their current level of trust in the 
trustee. These contextual factors can impact the development of trust, such as negative moods or 
interactions clouding the development of trust (Jones & George, 1998). Contextual factors have 
been found to be an important part of trust, such as organizational trust impacting individual 
level outcomes and beliefs (Schoorman et al., 2007). 
Hypothesis 3a: There will be an interaction between Trust and Reliability on reported 
partner trust, with individuals in the friends teams with 70% reliable automation reporting lower 
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trust in their partner than individuals in the friends teams with 100% reliable automation. The 
same relationship is anticipated for individuals in strangers teams, but to a lesser degree. 
Hypothesis 3b: There will be an interaction between Trust and Reliability on reported 
trust in automation, with individuals with 70% reliable automation reporting lower trust in the 
automation than individuals with 100% reliable automation, but individuals in friends teams 
reporting higher trust in the automation than strangers teams. 
 
Human Characteristics 
Trust in automation, much like trust in humans, is reportedly influenced by individual 
characteristics as well. One personality characteristic that has been linked to trust in automation 
is that of one’s propensity to trust. Propensity to trust is a stable personality characteristic that 
develops within an individual where an individual has a typical or usual tendency to trust others 
that can be changed over time but remains relatively stable for an individual (Lee & See, 2004). 
Interestingly, those with a higher propensity to trust are able to predict other’s trustworthiness 
better than those with a lower propensity to trust (Kikuchi, Watanabe, & Yamasishi, 1996). Lee 
and See (2004) suggest that those who are higher propensity to trust may be better at 
appropriately adjusting their trust in others depending on the situation; accurately attributing the 
trustworthiness of the automation to perform correctly. This suggests that those who are more 
trusting of others may be better at gauging the trustworthiness of the automation correctly, thus 
being able to use it to its fullest potential. This ability to gauge trustworthiness may also extend 
to relationships with teammates as well.   
Hypothesis 4a: Propensity to trust will moderate the effects of Trust on reported partner 
trust, with those higher on propensity to trust reporting higher partner trust. 
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An additional innate characteristic of the mind is that of schema formation. Schemas are 
cognitive structures that can help individuals interpret and organize information, and humans 
tend to automatically organize and categorize information into these structures (Fiske & Taylor, 
1984). These expectations of how members of categories (birds, for example, having wings 
would be a component of a bird schema while behavioral expectations for an athlete may fall 
into an athlete schema) behave and the strength of the schema can influence reactions to 
violations of these expectations. A common component of an automation schema that individuals 
have is that the automation has low to non-existent error rates (Dzindolet, Peterson, Pomranky, 
Pierce, & Beck, 2003). Some individuals may have an all-or-none thinking within their 
automation schema, where they may be more likely to notice any error by the automation and 
thereafter discount information supplied by the automation going forward. This all-or-none 
thinking regarding the performance of automation systems is referred to as a “perfect automation 
schema” (PAS), (Merritt, Unnerstall, Lee, & Huber, 2015). Those with a stronger PAS will be 
less forgiving of errors from the automation and may report lower estimated reliability of the 
automation than individuals who lack a PAS or who have a weaker PAS. Individuals who score 
higher on the PAS pay too much attention to errors by the automation and have a more rapid 
decline in perception of the automation’s reliability (Madhavan, Wiegmann, & Lacson, 2006). 
Perceptions of the reliability of the automation and trust in the automation are not always 
connected. Previous research has found that when trust in automation during a task is higher than 
one’s self confidence in the task, the task would be allocated to the automation. The opposite was 
also true, in that when trust in automation was lower than one’s self confidence in the task the 
task was not allocated to the automation (Lee & Moray, 1992). Perceptions of reliability of 
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automation can have impacts on whether the automation is over-trusted or under-trusted, and so 
it is important that any potential influences are examined separately from trust in automation. 
Hypothesis 4b: Those who score higher on the PAS measure will report lower estimates 
of the automation’s reliability than individuals who score lower on the PAS measure.  
Hypothesis 4c: There will be an interaction between Trust, Reliability, and PAS on 
estimates of the automation's reliability, with individuals scoring lower on the PAS consistently 
perceiving the automation's reliability more accurately and individuals in friends teams in the 
100% reliable automation condition perceiving the automation most accurately than the other 
experimental conditions. 
 
There are different degrees of automation that can be implemented within a system. A 
different amount of control can be delegated to humans or automation within a system depending 
under different conditions and demands (Endsley, 1999; Sheridan & Verplanck, 1978). The task 
within this study falls under the “Action Support” or AS level of automation, which is defined as 
a system that assists the operator with task performance, with some human control actions still 
required (Endsley, 1999). Each level of automation has implications and consequences for 
human performance. Complacency with automation can be thought of as a premature cognitive 
commitment where an individual develops attitudes towards a device in a particular context that 
are reinforced when the device is re-encountered in the same way (Langer, 1989; Parasuraman, 
Molloy, & Singh, 1993). Individuals who encounter inconsistently reliable automation are 
usually more aware of the failures of the automation and are less complacent, while those using a 
consistently reliable automation tend to become more complacent and less likely to notice errors 
(Parasuraman et al., 1993). These noticed errors impact the trust in and use of this automation, 
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and human disuse of the automation is commonly caused by false alarms (Parasuraman & Riley, 
1997). Individuals using a less reliable automation will be less likely to use it once it becomes 
clear that it is not reliable, as would be expected in the 70% reliability condition. Given that the 
other experimental condition has 100% reliable automation, one might predict that performance 
will be better for the teams using 100% reliable automation in the task. However, the opposite 
may be found. For rigid tasks with no flexibility in decision making, more reliance on 
automation may be best for the task but for the task used in this experiment and for many other 
environments where automation is used such as in aviation, time-critical decisions are common. 
Overreliance on automation (that is perceived to be highly reliable) might cause a kind of “tunnel 
vision,” (Cummings, 2004; Endsley, 2018). This tunnel vision may prevent the individual from 
fully utilizing all other information available, such as other reported contextual factors within the 
simulation, thereby missing important cues such as fire outbreaks elsewhere, that would 
normally influence their decisions.  
Hypothesis 5a: There will be performance differences between the 70% and 100% 
reliability conditions. 
 
 Additionally, team performance has been found to be better when the team consists of 
friends (stronger relationship(s) in comparison to teams consisting of strangers (weaker 
relationship(s) like strangers, especially in the case of teams engaged in decision making tasks 
(Shah & Jehn, 1993). These performance differences have been found to be influenced by 
increased group cooperation and commitment, as well as established patterns of positive 
communication (Jehn & Shah, 1997). 
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Hypothesis 5b: Teams composed of friends will perform better than teams composed of 
strangers. 
 
 Where it gets more complicated is considering the possibility of an interaction between 
automation reliability and team member relationships, and the impact of this interaction on 
performance. Prior theory supports the possibility that forms of conflict can sometimes be 
beneficial or detrimental to team decision-making and performance, and this conflict can be 
broken down into three kinds: 1) relationship conflict (interpersonal issues and feelings like 
frustration), 2) task conflict (differences related to the task itself), and 3) process conflict (how 
task accomplishment will proceed), (Jehn & Mannix, 2001). These forms of conflict can appear 
more often in teams of individuals who have not worked together long, as the team first figures 
out what “works” within the team environment (Tuckman & Jensen, 1977). In contrast, increased 
familiarity (stronger relationships) usually results in better communication, more trust between 
team members, and feelings of working towards a cooperative goal rather than a competitive one 
(Amason & Sapienza, 1997; Heider, 1958; Jehn & Mannix, 2001). If stronger relationships can 
function as a “reserve” from which teams can rely on when conflict becomes greater (due to the 
task or the process related to the task), teams composed of friends may perform better than 
strangers. Friends are more likely to not develop conflict within their team than strangers, and so 
may not experience the taxing nature of interpersonal conflict along with task conflict that 
strangers could experience. Friends may therefore be able to devote more resources to the task. 
Due to the unknowns surrounding all of these possible interactions, no expected performance 
outcome is being offered here. 
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Hypothesis 5c: There will be an interaction between the level of automation reliability 
and the level of trust between team members that impacts performance, with friends teams 




The participants were University of Connecticut students in the participant pool of the 
Department of Psychological Sciences, who received course credit for participating. The 186 
participants were about 61% female, 41% white, and on average 19 years old. Full demographics 
are reported in Table 1. Length of friendships, which served as a control variable for friends 
teams, were on average 10 months long, with a minimum of 1 month and a maximum of 60 
months (SD = 15.15). A total of 52 friends teams and 41 strangers teams of two individuals in 
each team were collected. One hundred and six individuals experienced the 70% reliability 
condition while 80 experienced the 100% reliability condition. Ninety-three individuals played 
the role of firefighter and 93 individuals played the role of the scout. A full breakdown of group 
membership is provided in Table 2. 
The teams designated as “strangers teams” were created by randomly assigning two 
individuals. Teams designated as “friends teams” were created in a step-wise manner in the 
following way: One individual was recruited from the participant pool and was asked to “bring a 
friend they trust” with them to complete the experiment. If the friend was also in the participant 
pool, this friend received course credit for whatever class they were enrolled in. Timeslot timing 
for each of the sessions were randomly chosen to represent each of the four experimental groups 
at random throughout each new week. Scheduling friend or stranger, reliable or unreliable 
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automation were predetermined prior to session creation in the system or randomly before 
participants arrived in the case of the automation reliability. Lab assistants were therefore not 
aware of what conditions comprised each session, in accordance with a double-blind design 
protocol. 
Experimental Task: Networked Fire Chief (NFC) 
NFC is a micro-world simulation program that is utilized in wildfire firefighting training. 
NFC is a low fidelity computer simulation of wildfire firefighting activities by individuals or 
groups of individuals (Omodei & Wearing, 1995). The firefighting environment is adjustable, 
making it possible for the main landscape to consist of physical elements, including forests, 
prairie, bodies of water, and houses. Some of these elements are more flammable and easily 
destroyed. Fire growth, speed, and landscape consumption are also adjustable, and these 
determine how quickly the fire will spread across the landscape and also how much and how fast 
the landscape is consumed. Wind speed and direction is also adjustable and facilitates the 
direction and speed of the fire. Landscapes and fire characteristics were selected to provide a 
balanced level of firefighting challenge across all three scenarios, including varied but 
comparable landscape structures. The landscape types are assigned different point values, which 
factor into the calculation of performance scores. 
Additionally, NFC offers a variety of roles that participants can fill. These can range from 
more active to more passive roles with varying responsibilities, but for this study the primary 
roles of concern were that of Scout and Firefighter. The automation system used within NFC for 
the present study was not something already included in the NFC program. This automation 
system was generated by the author and is described in greater detail in a later section. 
AUTOMATION AND INTERPERSONAL TRUST  25 
 
The tasks in Networked Fire Chief (NFC) in the present study consisted of three fire-
fighting scenarios lasting ten minutes each. The general goal in each scenario was to put out fires 
as fast as possible that would otherwise spread rapidly in this virtual environment. 
NFC Roles 
The Scout was responsible for guiding the Firefighter to fires. The Scout had the ability 
to view the entire map at once to look at fires and view the landscape and fire changes in real 
time. The Scout was also unique in their ability to see the early warning system (automation) in 
the form of fire warnings, further detailed in subsequent paragraphs. The Firefighter must rely on 
the Scout to be told where the fires are and the Scout must rely on the Firefighter in order to 
actually put out the fires. Both are responsible for maximizing firefighting performance. 
Performance scores for teams are calculated as the summed value of all the unburned land at the 
end of the trial, including the weighted point values of the elements (for example, houses are 
worth more than open pastures).  
The Firefighter was assigned four fire trucks to control using the mouse. Movement of 
the trucks was realistically delayed, in that there was no instantaneous teleportation to the desired 
location selected by the firefighter participant, but rather an animation of the truck “driving” 
across the screen at a fixed speed to the assigned coordinates. Firefighter participants clicked on 
fires to begin the firefighting process. The Firefighter was unable to see all fires as they were 
occurring in real time. As the trucks were moved within a certain distance from the fire, they 
could see the flames and what landscape had been destroyed or was currently on fire. The 
Firefighter therefore had to rely on the Scout to inform them where fires were developing and 
spreading. The trucks that were used to combat the fires had to be refilled at the various water 
sources (i.e. lakes) once they ran out. In order to avoid running out of water, Firefighters must 
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monitor the water levels, displayed as a percentage at the bottom of the screen when the 
Firefighter hovered their cursor over that particular truck. Firefighters had limited capabilities to 
zoom the map in and out and could not view the entire map at once. 
The Automation System 
The automation assistance system was designed and implemented by the author as an 
early warning system. Pilot testing and manipulation checks showed that this automated early 
warning system was probable and believable to participants. 
The early warning system for fires appeared as flashing red X’s on the Scout’s task 
screen. These flashing X’s appeared for 30 seconds, reporting the location of the next fire, and 
then 20 seconds later the next fire would immediately begin. The Scout was the only one on the 
team able to see these warnings. A fire warning appeared before every fire that began within the 
10-min scenario, and its accuracy depended on predetermined calculations and decisions for that 
particular fire at that particular moment in the scenario. Figure 5 shows an example of what a 
warning looks like within the simulation. Following a warning, the Scout had to make judgement 
call about the likelihood that a fire would appear based on their own sense of the reliability of the 
automation, and then had to decide whether to share the warning with the Firefighter and ask the 
Firefighter to send their trucks in order to maximize fire containment. 
The actual likelihood of the fire appearing in the location that the warning flashed 
depended on the condition the team was in. For the reliable automation condition, there was 
100% accuracy. The unreliable automation had an accuracy of 70%.  A 70% level was chosen 
because it was likely to prevent the Scout and Firefighter from completely dismissing the 
automation as an unhelpful system for the duration of the experiment yet making it possible for 
them to discern that the automation was not the altogether trustworthy. A 70% reliability has 
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been found in prior studies to be a “sweet spot” of unreliability, and one with real-world 
applicability (Barg-Walkow & Rogers, 2015). The unreliable automation consisted of warnings 
for fires that inaccurately reported locations some distance away from where the actual fire 
would eventually break out. In the reliable automation assistance condition, the automation that 
warned participants was 100% reliable and spatially accurate as far as where and when new fires 
would break out. This early warning system is referred to here as the Warning Awareness 
Automation, or WAA for short. 
Experimental Design 
The 2x2 between-subjects experimental design consisted of teams made up of friends 
versus strangers, and task conditions of reliable versus unreliable automation assistance. The 
condition combinations were set up so that each participant was in one social (friends or 
strangers) condition and one reliability (70% or 100%) condition. Figure 4 clarifies the various 
experimental conditions. 
Procedure 
Upon arrival, participants were offered the consent form to read through and sign. The 
experimenter spent approximately ten minutes reviewing the consent form and expectations 
regarding participant activities. Participants were then randomly assigned into their specific task 
roles, either Firefighter or Scout. Participants then completed a short survey serving of baseline 
measures.  
Participants were oriented to the task through a ten-minute orientation which contained 
information on performance scoring for landscape elements. Each element is worth a certain 
point value in order to encourage participants to prioritize and strategize their firefighting 
technique to prevent elements with high point values from being burned (e.g., houses). 
AUTOMATION AND INTERPERSONAL TRUST  28 
 
All participants in both friend or stranger and reliable or unreliable conditions completed 
three fire-fighting scenarios, each lasting 10 minutes. Data about task performance were not 
supplied to participants. There was a partition physically separating the participants from seeing 
one another or one another’s screens, but they were not restricted in how they could talk to one 
another. 
Upon completion of each of the three fire-fighting scenarios, participants completed 
surveys. They were debriefed on the automation’s possible unreliability and informed that their 
partners were not to blame for any mistakes or frustrations caused during the scenarios.   
The entire experimental session lasted 90 minutes. 
Measures 
Demographics. Collected demographics included gender, age, and ethnicity. 
Propensity to Trust. An eight-item scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly 
Agree) contained items such as “One should be very cautious with strangers” and “These days, 
you must be alert or someone is likely to take advantage of you.” This was assessed many days 
prior to the first session to minimize potential spillover effects (Mayer & Davis, 1999). 
Perfect Automation Schema. A three-item scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 
(Strongly Agree) contained items such as “If an automated system makes an error, then it is 
broken” and “If an automated system makes a mistake, then it is completely useless.” This was 
also assessed prior to the first session, so no spillover effects were possible (Merritt, Unnerstall, 
Lee, & Huber, 2015). 
Human Team Member Trust. This five-item scale contained items such as “We absolutely 
respect each other’s competence” and “Every team member present shows absolute integrity.” 
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Measured after every scenario, with response options ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 
(Strongly Agree) (Simons & Peterson, 2000). 
Trust in Automation Agent. A twelve-item scale contains items such as “I am suspicious of the 
system's intent, action, or output” and “I am wary of the system.” Measured after every scenario 
with response options ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree) (Jian, Bisantz, & 
Drury, 2000). 
Assignment of blame to automation. This two-item scale consisted of items such as “The 
automation was responsible for any errors that were made in the task,” on a scale from 1 
(Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). Measured after every scenario (Kim & Hinds, 2006). 
Assignment of credit to automation. This two-item scale that consists of items such as “Success 
on this task was largely due to the things the robot said or did,” on a scale from 1 (Strongly 
Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). Measured after every scenario (Kim & Hinds, 2006). 
Assignment of blame to self. This two-item scale that consists of items such as “I was responsible 
for any errors that were made in this task,” on a scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly 
Agree). Measured after every scenario (Kim & Hinds, 2006). 
Assignment of credit to self. Two question scale that consists of items such as “The success on 
this task was largely due to the things I said or did,” on a scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 
(Strongly Agree). Measured after every scenario (Kim & Hinds, 2006). 
Assignment of blame to team member. This two-item scale consists of items such as “My team 
member was to blame for most of the problems that were encountered in accomplishing this 
task,” with response options from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). Measured after 
every scenario (Kim & Hinds, 2006). 
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Assignment of credit to team member. This two-item scale consists of items such as “The success 
on this task was largely due to the things my team member,” on a scale from 1 (Strongly 
Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). Measured after every scenario (Kim & Hinds, 2006). 
Please see Table 4 for additional information about measures. 
Analysis 
 Analyses utilized only Time 3 results for the purpose of this particular study. 
Assessment of nonindependence. Individuals were grouped within teams. This design calls for an 
assessment of nonindependence to determine if and to what degree errors are correlated between 
team members. In order to calculate nonindependence, intraclass correlations (ICCs) were 
calculated for each outcome variable of interest. As shown in Table 5, ICCs indicated that many 
of the variables of interest had significant amounts of variance due to team membership. While 
not all ICCs were significant or large in value, multilevel modeling was still conducted given its 
fit with the experimental design. Multilevel modeling strategies are extremely important to use 
when considering teams, as classical statistics methods are not accurate given the data structure 
(Hox, Moerbeek, & Van de Schoot, 2017; Hox, 2013; Mathieu & Chen, 2011). Task 
performance on NFC remained a team-level variable. 
 Descriptives. Descriptive statistics and correlations for individual-level measures and the 
one team-level measure are displayed in Table 6. The nested nature of multilevel data causes 
inflation in Type I error, so p-values for bivariate correlations were not reported. Variables 
reflected satisfactory normal distributions. 
Hypothesis Testing. Power analyses as well as trust in automation related studies’ 
reported sample and effect sizes indicated acceptable sample sizes with a weak to moderate 
power of .56 to .68 (Bailey & Scerbo, 2007; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007; Lee & See, 
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2004; McBride, Rogers, & Fisk, 2014). Additionally for multilevel modeling more than 60 teams 
or grouping variables are recommended and at least 100 groups for multilevel structural equation 
modeling (SEM) (Eliason, 1993; Hox, 2013; Hox, Maas, & Brinkhuis, 2010). 
For all models, maximum likelihood (ML) estimation was used and level-2 predictors 
were treated as fixed effects (Condition, comprised of Stranger or Friends teams, and Reliability, 
comprised of the 70% reliability and 100% reliability teams). For each model, random intercepts 
were included to determine best model fit. Best model and fit are reported for each hypothesis. 
Reported fixed effects reflect the effect of Stranger or Friend Condition and Reliability 
Condition (both level-2 variables) on participant outcomes (level-1). The statistics software R 
and packages lme4, nlme, and MCMCglmm were used to analyze the data (Bates, Maechler, 
Bolker, Walker, 2015; Hadfield, 2010; Pinheiro, Bates, DebRoy, Sarkar, & R Core Team, 2017; 
R Core Team, 2017). 
Intercept only models were first calculated for the outcome variables. 
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
 Pilot testing showed that individuals correctly reported the 70% Reliability Condition 
scenarios as less reliable than the 100% Reliable Condition scenarios. 
 Additionally, t-tests were used to compare trust between strangers and between friends to 
ensure that trust was significantly different between the experimental conditions of 
strangers/friends before any experimental conditions began. Results showed that there was a 
significant difference between friends and strangers for trust of their partners, with friends teams 
showing a mean of 4.68 and strangers teams a mean of 3.69 (p < .05). Another t-test was used to 
examine if there were any baseline differences in trust between those assigned to the 70% 
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reliability condition and those assigned to the 100% reliability condition, as there should not be 
given the assumptions of random assignment. As predicted, there were no differences in baseline 
trust levels between the 70% and 100% reliability conditions with both conditions showing a 
mean of ~4.25 (p > .05). Perfect Automation Schema (PAS) and propensity to trust were both 
assessed separately from the experiment session by placing the questions on a “participant pool 
questionnaire” that was administered at the beginning of the semester to all students in the 
participant pool, and that contained a variety of survey measures that could be retrieved through 
use of participant IDs. Please see Table 3 for reliability scores. 
Hypothesized Relationships 
Hypotheses 1a through 2c 
Hypotheses 1a through 2c examined effects on assignment of credit for the successes in 
the simulation and blame for mistakes in the simulation. 
The main effect of the Trust Condition on attribution of credit to the automation was not 
significant (b = -0.18, t = -1.04, p > .05). The main effect of the Reliability condition on 
attribution of credit to the automation was not significant (b = -0.11, t = -0.61, p > .05), or the 
interaction of Trust Condition and Reliability on attribution of credit to the automation (b = 0.23, 
t = 0.87, p > .05). The main effect of the Trust Condition on attribution of credit to the self was 
not significant (b = 0.01, t = 0.07, p > .05), nor was the main effect of Reliability on attribution 
of credit to the self (b = -0.03, t = -0.20, p > .05) or the interaction of Trust Condition and 
Reliability on attribution of credit to the self (b = -0.29, t = -1.31, p > .05). The main effect of the 
Trust Condition on attribution of credit to their partner was not significant (b = -.30, t = -1.96, p 
= .08). The main effect of the Reliability condition on attribution of credit to their partner was 
not significant (b = -0.04, t = -0.23, p > .05), or the interaction of Trust Condition and Reliability 
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on attribution of credit to their partner (b = 0.004, t = 0.02, p > .05). Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c 
were not supported. 
The interaction of Trust and Reliability Conditions were also examined on the attribution 
of blame on the automation, the self, and their partner. The main effect of the Trust Condition on 
attribution of blame on the automation was not significant (b = -0.02, t = -0.11, p > .05). The 
main effect of the Reliability condition on attribution of blame on the automation was not 
significant (b = 0.13, t = 0.59, p > .05), or the interaction of Trust Condition and Reliability on 
attribution of blame on the automation (b = -0.07, t = -0.21, p > .05). The main effect of the Trust 
Condition on attribution of blame on the self was not significant (b = -0.08, t = -0.48, p > .05). 
The main effect of Reliability on attribution of blame on the self was significant (b = -0.38, t = -
2.23, p < .05), with individuals in the 100% Reliability Condition placing less blame on 
themselves for mistakes than those in the 70% Reliability Condition. The interaction of Trust 
Condition and Reliability on attribution of blame on the self was not significant (b = 0.23, t = 
0.91, p > .05). The main effect of the Trust Condition on attribution of blame on their partner 
was not significant (b = -0.003, t = -0.02, p > .05). The main effect of the Reliability condition on 
attribution of blame on their partner was not significant (b = -0.15, t = -1.05, p > .05), or the 
interaction of Trust Condition and Reliability on attribution of blame on their partner (b = -0.05, t 
= -0.25, p > .05). The model for the effect of the interaction on blame of self was a significantly 
better fit than the intercept only model (χ2 = 28.88, p < .05). Hypothesis 2a was partially 
supported. Hypotheses 2b and 2c were not supported. 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b sought to evaluate whether the experimental conditions of trust 
between partners and reliability of the automation would impact reported partner trust and trust 
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of the automation. Results showed that the main effect of Reliability (b = 0.007, t = 0.06, p > .05) 
and the interaction of Trust Condition and Reliability (b = -0.06, t = -0.33, p > .05) did not have a 
significant effect on reported trust of partners. There was a main effect of Trust Condition on 
reported trust in partner, with those in the strangers teams reporting less trust in their partner, but 
this was to be expected given the experimental design (b = -0.47, t = -4.22, p < .05). Chi-square 
comparisons show this model to be a better fit than the intercept only model (χ 2 = 30.19, p < 
.05). Hypotheses 3a was not fully supported. 
Hypothesis 3b examined the effects of the experimental conditions on trust in 
automation, with no significant main effects of Trust Condition on trust in automation (b = -0.06, 
t = -0.37, p > .05) or main effect of Reliability on trust in automation (b = -0.03, t = -0.15, p > 
.05). There was also no interaction between Trust Condition and Reliability (b = -0.02, t = -0.08, 
p > .05). Hypotheses 3a and 3b were not fully supported. 
Hypothesis 4a was concerned with the potential effect of one’s propensity to trust and 
interactions with conditions on the outcomes of trust in partner. Grand mean centering was used 
for propensity for trust (Finch, Bolin, & Kelley, 2016). There were no main effects of Reliability 
(b = -0.02, t = -0.14, p > .05), and propensity to trust (b = -0.11, t = -0.65, p > .05) on reported 
partner trust. There continued to be a main effect of Trust Condition on reported trust, as 
expected (b = -0.58, t = -4.72, p < .05) with individuals in the friends teams reporting greater 
partner trust. Additionally, there were no significant interactions between Trust Condition and 
Reliability (b = 0.14, t = 0.76, p > .05), Trust Condition and propensity to trust (b = 0.10, t = 
0.40, p > .05), and Reliability and propensity to trust (b = 0.23, t = 0.89, p > .05) on the reported 
partner trust. No three-way interaction between Trust Condition, Reliability, and propensity to 
trust (b = 0.16, t = 0.41, p > .05) was found on reported partner trust. While a chi-square test 
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could not be used to compare the models, the change in AIC and BIC metrics reflects a better 
fitting model (2) than the intercept only model (1) (AIC1=352.18, AIC2=297.96, BIC1=361.83, 
BIC2=328.77). Hypothesis 4a was not fully supported. 
While not initially hypothesized, a similar model was tested using one’s perfect 
automation schema (PAS) as a moderator instead of propensity to trust. Grand mean centering 
was used for personal automation schema (Finch et al., 2016). Testing for these effects showed 
no main effects of Trust Condition (b = -0.10, t = -0.56, p > .05), Reliability (b = -0.03, t = -0.18, 
p > .05), and PAS (b = -0.10, t = -0.80, p > .05) on reported trust in automation. Additionally, 
there were no significant interactions between Trust Condition and Reliability (b = 0.04, t = 0.15, 
p > .05), Trust Condition and PAS (b = -0.08, t = -0.39, p > .05), and Reliability and PAS (b = -
0.03, t = -.16, p > .05) on the reported trust in automation. No three-way interaction between 
Trust Condition, Reliability, and PAS (b = 0.21, t = 0.64, p > .05) was found on reported trust in 
automation. 
Hypotheses 4b and 4c 
Hypothesis 4b was concerned with how perceptions of the automation’s reliability might 
be altered by one’s individual score of the PAS measure while Hypothesis 4c predicted an 
interaction between Trust, Reliability, and PAS. 
Testing for these effects showed no main effects of Trust (b = -0.32, t = -0.64, p > .05), 
Reliability (b = 0.49, t = 1.00, p > .05), and PAS (b = 0.25, t = 0.67, p > .05) on reported 
perception of the automation’s reliability. Additionally, there were no significant interactions 
between Trust Condition and Reliability (b = 0.36, t = 0.48, p > .05), Trust Condition and PAS (b 
= -0.87, t = -1.49, p > .05), and Reliability and PAS (b = -.90, t = -1.45, p > .05) on the reported 
perception of the automation’s reliability. 
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A three-way interaction between Trust Condition, Reliability, and PAS (b = 0.53, t = 
2.19, p < .05) was found, with Figure 6 showing the interaction and Table 9 showing the 
intergroup differences. 
In the 100% reliable automation condition, individuals with high PAS scores on friends 
teams perceived the automation to be less reliable. This is not surprising because Individuals 
with higher PAS scores supposedly have a schema for automation that holds automation to a 
higher standard; that is, if the automation makes any mistakes they feel it should no longer be 
used. Mistakes by the automation are also noticed sooner by these individuals, with any mistakes 
counted heavily against the automation. Also as expected, individuals with lower PAS on friends 
teams in this 100% reliable automation condition perceived the automation to have higher 
reliability, reflecting a schema for automation that was more relaxed and being less critical of a 
lack of perfection. In contrast, participants on strangers teams in this same 100% reliable 
automation condition displayed the opposite relationship between PAS and automation 
reliability: as their PAS scores increased, their perception of the automation’s reliability 
increased rather than decreased. 
In the 70% reliable automation condition, the relationships described above are somewhat 
reversed.  Those individuals on friends teams displayed a similar unexpected relationship 
between PAS and perceived automation reliability but to a lesser degree: as their PAS scores 
increased, so did their perception of the automation’s reliability which made their perception 
more accurate (see Figure 6). However, these relationships returned to normal in the case of 
strangers teams, with those scoring higher on PAS perceiving the automation’s reliability as 
lower, while those scoring lower on PAS perceived the reliability of the automation as higher, 
and this case more accurately. 
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The complicated findings described above for the significant three-way interaction can be 
summarized as follows: an individual’s PAS score alone cannot be used in isolation to predict 
how a team member will perceive automation reliability when functioning as a member of a 
team. When teams are composed of friends and the automation is very reliable, one can expect 
those with low PAS scores to perceive the automation to be more reliable, while those with high 
PAS scores tend to perceive the automation as less reliable. When teams are composed of 
strangers but the automation is not completely reliable, one can expect those with low PAS 
scores to report the automation as being more reliable, while those with high PAS scores tend to 
report perceptions of the automation’s reliability as being lower.   
While a chi-square test could not be used to compare the models, the change in AIC and 
BIC metrics reflects a better fitting model (2) than the intercept only model (1) (AIC1=834.05, 
AIC2=797.51, BIC1=843.66, BIC2=828.98). Hypothesis 4a was not supported while Hypothesis 
4b was supported. 
Hypotheses 5a, 5b, and 5c 
Hypotheses 5a through 5c were concerned with the effects that reliability of the 
automation and Trust Condition might have on performance. An ANOVA was used to analyze 
these hypotheses because of the team-level nature of the performance variable. It was found that 
Trust was not a significant predictor of performance (F = 0.11, p < .05). Reliability was found to 
be a significant predictor of performance, as expected, with those in the 100% reliability 
condition performing nearly 21% better than those in the 70% reliability condition (M of 70% 
reliability = 55.86, M of 100% reliability = 76.52, F = 9.12, p > .05). There was no interaction 
between Trust Condition and the reliability of the automation (F = 0.59, p > .05). Hypotheses 5b 
and 5c are not supported while Hypothesis 5a is supported. 
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Supplementary Analyses 
 In the interests of transparency, the demographic of gender was incorporated into some 
analyses to assess if there were interactions. More specifically, rather than using gender as a 
control or gender itself as a predictor, the gender makeup of the team was instead considered in a 
set of additional analyses. Gender, or at least gender standing in as a proxy for all gender-specific 
experiences (explained in part through Social Role Theory), has been found to be an influence on 
different interactions with technology (LePine, Hollenbeck, Ilgen, Colquitt, & Ellis, 2002). 
However, these differences have been inconsistent especially related to trust in automation, and 
team gender composition has rarely been considered in trust in automation studies to date (Hoff 
& Bashir, 2015). Gender composition in teams has been seen to impact individual and team 
outcomes, with the literature commonly concluding that men benefit more with the inclusion of 
women on teams while women typically see small benefits or even negative impacts. Women 
can be more negatively impacted by mixed-gender teams related to constructs such as self-
efficacy and having to work harder than their male teammates, and the literature is divided on 
whether teams that are majority male will have more negative performance (Cawkill, Rogers, 
Knight, & Spear, 2009; Hirschfeld, Jordan, Feild, Giles, & Armenakis, 2005; Leon, Nist, & 
Magor, 2004; LePine et al., 2002; Leon, 2005). It would benefit the field of research on trust in 
automation to add to this body of literature, and so these supplementary analyses were done with 
this goal in mind. 
 With the available data, 24 teams were coded as all female, 15 were coded as all male, 
and 22 were coded as mixed-gender. Full breakdowns of condition membership are in Table 8. 
Some group numbers are small in amount, and so caution is advised regarding power of these 
analyses. 
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 No significant effect of team gender composition was found on team performance (F = 
.009, p < .05). Team gender composition was not found to be a significant predictor for any of 
the outcome variables nor did it interact with Reliability Condition, Trust Condition, propensity 
to trust, or PAS. Since gender was not a variable of primary concern for this study, the focus was 
never on achieving balanced team gender composition grouping within experimental conditions. 
Thus, these particular models may have been underpowered to find significant effects of team 
gender composition. Analyses are planned at the team level to assess possible interactions but are 
beyond the scope of the present study. 
Discussion 
 The current research study sought to provide an initial exploration into the possibility of 
human trust interacting with trust placed in automation. By using an experimental approach, this 
study utilized controls possible in a laboratory setting to examine trust in automation in a new 
way. Using the firefighting simulation Networked Fire Chief, this study examined how the 
strength of human trust between the team members might interact with human trust in the 
reliability of the automation. 
Results Summary 
 There was only partial support found for Hypotheses 1a through 2c that examined team 
members' assignment of credit for performance successes in the simulation and blame for 
mistakes in the simulation. Hypotheses 1a through 1c, which predicted effects on attribution of 
credit, were not supported. Hypotheses 2a through 2c which predicted differences in attribution 
of blame was partially supported, in that individuals in the 100% Reliability Condition placed 
less blame on themselves for mistakes than those in the 70% Reliability Condition. 
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Hypotheses 3a and 3b sought to evaluate whether the experimental conditions of trust 
between partners and reliability of the automation would interact and impact reported partner 
trust. Partial support for these hypotheses was also found, where strangers teams reported less 
trust in their partner than teams of friends. However, this finding was to be expected and served 
as a manipulation check given the experimental design goal of controlling for this difference in 
trust through participant recruitment of strangers versus friends. The interaction between 
reliability of the automation and trust of human partner was of greater interest but this interaction 
was not significant nor were any effects on trust in automation. Hypothesis 3a or 3b was not 
supported. 
Hypothesis 4a concerned the potential effect of one’s propensity to trust and possible 
interactions with automation reliability conditions on the outcomes of trust in partner. This 
hypothesis was partially supported because of the continued significant effect of Trust Condition 
on reported partner trust, but no other effects or interactions were significant. 
Expanding on the idea of the Perfect Automation Schema (PAS), Hypotheses 4b and 4c 
predicted an interaction between the Trust Condition, Reliability, and PAS, and effects on blame 
of the automation for failures in the simulation and attributing credit to the automation for 
successes. Hypothesis 4b was not supported, but a significant three-way interaction was found 
between the Reliability Condition, Trust Condition, and PAS on perception of the automation’s 
reliability, partially supporting Hypothesis 4c. 
Performance of the teams was an additional outcome of interest, with Hypotheses 5a, 5b, 
and 5c predicting effects of the automation reliability and amount of trust between partners on 
the team performance in the scenario. Reliability of the automation was found to be a significant 
predictor of performance, with those in the 100% reliability condition performing nearly 21% 
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better than those in the 70% reliability condition. Hypothesis 5a was supported, while 
Hypotheses 5b and 5c were not. 
Human Trust in Automation 
 The significant effects found in multiple hypothesized relationships involving the trust 
condition and reported partner trust were to be expected and suggest that the experimental design 
and manipulations were effective and that associated assumptions were valid. It was also to be 
expected that a laboratory experiment lasting less than two hours would not change the 
foundational trust between friends, nor could participating in several task scenarios in a 
laboratory much affect the development of friendship or trust between strangers. It is interesting 
to note that there were no differences in the development of trust amounts between strangers at 
either level of automation reliability. This suggests that the reliability of the automation did not 
impact the levels of trust between human partners.  
The lack of impact of automation reliability on stranger’s reported trust levels can be 
considered both a good and bad outcome. On the one hand, it is ideal that automation error rates 
do not seem to impact the level of trust between humans, as the ramifications of this effect could 
have serious consequences. For example, a new team of individuals working together and using 
an unreliable automated decision aid is not likely to have existing or developing human trust 
levels between team members affected by this unreliable automation- and this may help prevent 
interpersonal fault lines within the team from developing in reaction to unreliable automation. 
Improper displacement of trust can be as serious as improper placement of trust, as a relationship 
between two human partners should not suffer because of a third party’s (the automation, in this 
example) mistakes. On the other hand, this lack of effect of reliability of automation on trust 
between individuals can also be potentially problematic. This could have served as another 
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avenue for intervention or method of change for failing systems where an adjustment in the level 
of trust team members place in each other actually needs to change; for example, via training 
team members to be more cautious and less complacent. If some teams are known to be 
particularly susceptible to “groupthink,” the reliability of the automation used by the team could 
be purposely manipulated during training exercises in order to promote recalibration of trust 
levels by individuals in order to make sure that trust is at the level it should be. Later discussion 
will examine sample size limitations that prevent definitive conclusions regarding this finding. 
Human Trust and Trust in Automation 
Hypotheses 2a through 2c concerning the distribution of blame and credit was partially 
supported, with team members in the 100% reliable automation condition placing less blame on 
themselves for mistakes made during the simulation than team members in the 70% reliable 
automation condition. This relationship was found to be consistent across the trust conditions, 
evident with individuals working with a stranger as well as with individuals working with a 
friend, all showing this same difference. While the automation reliability relationship was not 
significant for attributing credit to the self, the finding that the reliability of the automation 
affected placing blame on oneself for perceived mistakes made in the scenario supports the idea 
that self-serving bias, an effect introduced in the Introduction section limited to individuals, 
(Groom et al., 2010; Kim & Hinds, 2006; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997; You et al., 2011) may be 
at work as well in this teamwork setting. When individuals are determining where to place blame 
for mistakes that are made when working with a human partner as well as an automation partner, 
unique patterns may emerge. Individuals may have erroneously concluded that they did a good 
job, when in reality the automation was giving 100% reliable information and may have equally 
contributed to better outcomes in these scenarios. And while this implies that differences in 
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attribution of credit should then have been obvious, individuals may still have been reluctant to 
not take credit themselves while at the same time remaining comfortable reporting that any 
mistakes were not their fault. This inconsistent pattern of behavior can potentially have impacts 
on whether or not an individual decides an automation is worth continuing to use and/or depend 
on, even though it is providing 100% accurate and useful information. By assigning less blame to 
themselves when the automation is making a real difference, this also has the potential to impact 
system performance over time by causing an inflation of one’s perception of one’s own abilities 
when interacting with an automated system. However, given that there were no significant 
impacts on attribution of credit for the successes within the task scenarios, the individuals may 
either not be fully aware of this bias or due to social desirability bias may have been hesitant to 
either take away or give credit from anyone in the scenario. Further exploration of other factors 
is needed that might influence one’s attribution of blame and/or credit related to automation 
under these circumstances. 
 Interestingly, there was no significant difference between ratings of trust in automation in 
the friends versus strangers conditions. This suggests that the amount of trust between humans 
did not directly impact trust in automation. This is somewhat surprising, given the similarities 
discussed earlier between human-human and human-automation trust, and other variables known 
to influence reported trust in automation, and an expected transfer effect from human trust to 
trust in automation. However, Lee and See (2004) do make a compelling argument for claims 
that human trust is much more complicated than trust in automation; it is possible that a transfer 
effect between human trust and trust in automation is harder to induce than expected in a 
simulated task under laboratory conditions. It may be necessary to have a differently composited 
task that is more focused, or to test for this under real task conditions, in order to see trust 
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transfer from humans to automation, or from automation to humans. It may also be the case that 
manipulating the percent reliability of an automated system alone is not enough to create 
significant interactions between human trust and trust in automation. Manipulation of other 
variables might result in such effects, such as introducing a series of categorical automation 
failures (e.g., system freezing up resulting in delayed actions, incomplete actions, etc.) rather 
than only changing the percentage of time the automation is reliable. This possibility is expanded 
on later in the discussion of future research. 
 Perceptions of the reliability of the automation were also not significantly affected by the 
experimental conditions of friends versus strangers. Discussion of the potential limitations of 
analyzing only one time point occurs below but in addition, it is also possible that neither the 
trust between partners nor the automation reliability conditions alone affected perceptions of the 
automation’s reliability. The human trust conditions in this study were more exploratory in 
nature, but it is nonetheless surprising that the automation reliability conditions alone did not 
change perceptions of reliability, especially given the pilot test results where participants readily 
reported recognizing such changes in reliability in the debriefing session. The unreliability of the 
automation almost went unnoticed when compared to the 100% reliable condition, and so the 
question remains why this perceived difference in the pilot study was not also found in the main 
study given no major changes to the experimental design or demographics of participants. It is 
possible that there are underlying influences causing this effect to occur, or as discussed in the 
limitations section, this may be due to survey instrument limitations or simply an underpowered 
effect. 
Human-Human and Human Automation Teams 
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Of some interest given that the main goal of the present study was to examine 
interactions in trust relationships, a significant three-way interaction was found between 
Reliability Condition, Trust Condition, and PAS on the perception of the automation’s reliability. 
Results indicate that individuals in the 100% reliable automation condition perceived the 
automation differently than those in the 70% reliable automation condition when Trust Condition 
and the PAS of the individual is also accounted for. 
To consider the implications of this significant three-way interaction, findings related to 
participants within the 100% reliable automation condition are discussed first. Participants on 
strangers teams in the 100% reliable automation condition perceived the automation to be more 
reliable (and in fact were more accurate in their perception) when their PAS scores were higher. 
As previously explained, higher scores on the PAS indicates individuals have a schema for 
automation that is more rigid -- individuals with a high PAS score expect that automation is, for 
lack of a better word, perfect; think that if the automation makes any mistakes it should not be 
used, and also tend to notice any mistakes on the part of the automation immediately. Results 
indicated that participants in the strangers teams with higher PAS scores were the most accurate 
regarding the automation’s true reliability. Individuals with lower scores on the PAS were less 
accurate and also perceived automation reliability to be lower, possibly because they are more 
likely to assume automation will make mistakes and this biases their ratings. 
Interestingly, participants on friends teams exhibited the opposite effect within the 100% 
reliable automation condition. Participants on friends teams perceived the automation to be less 
reliable when their PAS scores were higher but participants who had lower PAS scores perceived 
the automation to have a higher reliability (and were in fact more accurate). Put another way, 
participants who had lower PAS scores and a more relaxed or forgiving view of automation 
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correctly perceived the automation as more reliable in the 100% reliability condition. Given that 
the only difference from the previously discussed group is that these individuals were in teams 
consisting of friends, this leads the conclusion that something must be occurring at the social 
level between friends versus strangers to account for the opposing findings. Given that 
participants on friends teams and with lower PAS scores were more accurate than participants on 
strangers teams in their reported perceived reliability of the automation, this suggests that human 
trust between friends overshadows all perceptions of the automation, an empirical finding which 
establishes that human trust can interfere with the accuracy of perceptions of automation 
reliability. 
Looking at the individuals in the 70% reliable automation condition, however, we find 
some of these relationships are complicated further due to other interactions. For individuals in 
the 70% reliable automation condition, individuals in friends teams perceived the automation 
more accurately if their PAS score was higher. As one’s PAS score increased, so did the reported 
perception of the automation’s reliability, while those low on PAS tended to underestimate the 
accuracy of the automation (this relationship is somewhat weaker than the similar positive 
relationship for the strangers teams in the 100% reliable automation condition). Participants in 
strangers teams displayed the opposite relationship, with those scoring more highly on PAS 
perceiving the automation’s reliability as lower (which was in fact inaccurate) while those 
scoring lower on PAS perceiving reliability of the automation to be higher (and in fact closer to 
the actual reliability). Figure 6 highlights these correct and incorrect perceptions using green 
circles for the occurrence of correct perceptions and red circles for the occurrence of incorrect 
perceptions. 
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Proposed New Model Explaining H-H H-M Interactions 
Table 9 shows the group differences, and it becomes clear that two distinct groups form. 
Participants in the friends teams in the 100% reliable automation group were not significantly 
different from the participants in strangers teams in the 70% reliable automation group; 
essentially either high trust and high reliability or low trust and low reliability show matched 
outcomes. Similarly, participants in the friends teams in the 70% reliable automation group were 
not significantly different from the participants in strangers teams in the 100% reliable 
automation group; essentially either high trust and low reliability or low trust and high reliability 
show matched outcomes. Therefore, these participants can be conceptualized as Matched Trust 
(H-H and H-M) Participants and Mixed Trust Participants. 
It appears that something about the trust between participants is impacting their 
perception of automation by reversing the expected relationship between their PAS scores and 
their ratings of automation reliability. If we consider the previous discussion on how the three 
main building blocks of trust in humans and trust of automation systems may intersect, this 
outcome relationship may be easier to understand. Human trust components of ability, integrity, 
and benevolence (Hoff & Bashir, 2015; Mayer et al., 1995; Parasuraman et al., 2000) share many 
similarities with components of human trust in automation: process, and purpose, as detailed 
earlier (see Figure 3). Ability and performance both refer to the capability of the human and 
automation to achieve goals related to the user/trustor, and so these components show close 
alignment. Benevolence and purpose also are aligned because both are associated with the 
trustor’s perceived view of the trustee, which in the case of automation is what humans perceive 
are the intentions of the automation. Integrity and process are ingrained qualities of the agent, 
whether human or automation, and so are also aligned with each other. 
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If we look for consistent relationships across the Matched Trust and Mixed Trust groups, 
there are a few possibilities that emerge. Participants in friends teams within the 100% reliable 
automation condition showed behavior consistent with the theoretical assumptions behind PAS: 
a high PAS score predicting that participants readily penalize the automation for perceived 
errors, with the expected outcome of these individuals perceiving lower automation reliability.  
Participants in strangers teams in the 70% reliable automation condition exhibit this same 
predicted outcome; participants with a high PAS score causing participants readily penalize the 
automation for perceived errors, which would explain lower perceived automation reliability. In 
both cases these participants high on PAS were in error regarding their perception of the actual 
automation reliability; their PAS appears to have been a hindrance to correctly assessing the 
automations’ reliability for those participants in friends teams with 100% reliability and strangers 
teams with 70% reliability. And so therefore the combination of matched trust of the human 
partner and context reliability of the automation partner (condition grouping of friends and 100% 
reliability and strangers and 70% reliability) and high PAS creates a recipe for inaccurate 
perceptions of automation reliability. 
The groups mentioned above who were who were in equivalent situations in regard to 
facing a Mixed Trust situation, participants in friends teams with 70% reliable automation as 
well as the participants in strangers teams with 100% reliable automation, were both teams 
exhibiting the opposite relationship with PAS; those scoring more highly on PAS became the 
most accurate assessors of the automation’s reliability. This is counterintuitive to the theory 
behind PAS, that participants scoring highly on PAS should be penalizing the automation more 
for perceived errors and then would be perceiving the automation as less reliable. However, it 
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was those scoring lower on the PAS for the Mixed Trust groups who judged the automation as 
being less reliable.  
Why might this be the case? Something about individuals in high trust, low reliability or 
low trust, high reliability is causing this reversal in the PAS relationship. Participants scoring 
highly on PAS in these groups possibly remained just as “all or nothing” thinking about 
automation as their peers, but were more accurate in their reported perceptions of the 
automation’s reliability. It is possible that being placed in an environment with conflicting 
contextual trust cues triggers something different within participants high PAS to more 
accurately assess the reliability of the automation. Those low in PAS may expect more errors in 
automation in general, while those high in PAS expect to see perfect automation; the conflicting 
contextual cues may make a lower PAS detrimental to accurate perception of the reliability. This 
may be a previously unknown dimension of PAS that was not reported earlier due to human trust 
being ignored as a possible influence on perceptions of reliability of the automation. 
These differences may further support a major line of theory within the field of Human 
Factors: that context matters. Clearly the surrounding work environment can have serious 
impacts on individuals and their perceptions. Prior research has found that as much as 70% of 
performance variability can be attributed to design factors (Henning, Bizarro, Dove-Steinkamp, 
& Calabrese, 2014). While no performance effects were found in this study, perceptions of 
reliability of automation were influenced. It is not clear yet given the short length of this study 
whether these effects are long lasting, whether they are diminished or exacerbated over time, or 
if they cascade into other effects eventually. It very well may be that evidence of different 
perceptions of the automation’s reliability is an early warning sign of things to come. Teams in 
real workplace settings over longer periods of time may be experiencing these effects in their 
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mature form, with the perceptions of the automation’s reliability affecting usage or over or 
under-trust. 
When a reduction or reversal of an expected effect occurs due to interactions among 
variables the emergent systems effect is referred to as antagonistic, as opposed to a synergistic 
effect that can be represented by an unexpected strengthening of an existing effect or an 
altogether new effect that is considered a positive outcome (Beppler, Tekin, Mao, White, 
McDiarmid, Vargas, Miller, Savage, & Yeh, 2016). In the case of trust in automation, 
unexpected antagonistic effects born in the milieu of team dynamics could easily cascade into 
something beyond control or repair, an effect that is named coupling in the automation literature. 
Coupling refers to the potential for events or faults to have multiple cascading effects or impacts, 
with higher levels of complexity of a system creating higher risk for unexpected consequential 
effects (Sarter, Woods, & Billings, 1997). The complexities of trust in automation when there is 
only one human involved are still not fully understood, and so adding the complexities of a 
sociotechnical system to the mix, with antagonistic interactions now evident as shown in the 
present study, suggests that a better understanding of the full scope of these interactions is 
needed in order to avoid potentially destructive outcomes. 
Task Performance 
In most cases, task performance in the present study was not affected as predicted, with 
only the reliability of the automation affecting the final performance score of the team, which 
was expected. Thus, Hypothesis 5a was supported, in that teams in the 70% reliable automation 
condition performed worse than teams with the 100% reliable automation condition. This makes 
both logical and theoretical sense, with participants seemingly making effective use of whatever 
automation was available to them, for good or ill. Further exploration is needed to determine 
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whether this difference occurred because the teams stopped using automation altogether in the 
70% reliable automation or continued to use it in some limited way but still to their detriment. In 
either case, their underlying reason for doing one or the other remains of some interest. 
Limitations and Future Research 
 There are limitations to this study that may caution full acceptance of conclusions drawn 
from the empirical findings. While the study met sample size expectations for multilevel 
modeling, it is possible that the power analyses overestimated the effect sizes that these 
conditions would generate (Bailey & Scerbo, 2007; Eliason, 1993; Faul et al., 2007; Hox, 2013; 
Hox et al., 2010; Lee & See, 2004; McBride et al., 2014). Given the exploratory nature of this 
study, it is also possible that predicted effect sizes were actually smaller than anticipated, 
resulting in inflated reported power. Both of these possibilities raise legitimate concerns about 
null findings, suggesting that replication of this experiment in its current form and in alternate 
forms, with adjusted conditions and also a larger sample size, may be necessary before firm 
conclusions can be drawn about the reported null findings. 
 Additionally, although more data was collected across multiple time points in this 
experiment, only the third and final time point was used in the present analyses. It is possible that 
trust developed differently over time for the two experimental groups, stranger teams versus 
friends teams, but these effects remain hidden when analyzing only one time point. Application 
of a longitudinal multilevel framework in the analysis may reveal a number of new effects 
regarding trust development. For example, it may be that for each of the four experimental 
groups in the present study, trust had different rates of development or other significant patterns 
had emerged. This may be especially true for the perceptions of the reliability of the automation. 
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Proper consideration of longitudinal effects like these is planned in future analyses and would be 
used to explore these possibilities. 
The lack of differences in perception of the reliability of the automation between the 
main effect of 70% reliable and 100% reliable condition is unexpected, given the results of the 
pilot testing. This unexpected result may be explained in part due to use of a different assessment 
approach. Participants in the pilot test were asked in a forced-choice format which scenarios 
were unreliable or reliable, while the perception of the automation system reliability in the main 
study was assessed using a Likert scale ranging from 0% accurate to 100% accurate in 10% 
increments. It is possible that this increase in response complexity had the effect of diluting the 
effect. 
Future directions for this research are comprised of two approaches; adjustments to the 
current study design and reformulations of the study design. One adjustment would be to test 
different automation system reliability conditions assuming that the 70% reliability condition 
was not distinct from the 100% reliability condition. However,70% is considered a “gold 
standard” percent of unreliability in automation research, and any automation systems that has 
less than 70% reliable may be of dubious value. Nonetheless, this is a consideration that can be 
considered in future research. A more useful approach could be to adjust the rate of events (fire 
frequency) within the scenarios, to make it easier to distinguish between the different reliability 
conditions. Ten fires occurred within each of the scenarios in the present study, and perhaps the 
number of fires could be doubled or the length of scenarios increased. 
Possible future directions include the introduction of automation with “personality.” The 
software used within this study is very basic and does not offer more casual interactions with the 
human. As artificial intelligence (AI) becomes more complicated and advanced, questions about 
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how humans will treat more sophisticated AI remain. It may be possible that humans treat AI 
with more human like personality differently when it comes to assigning blame or trust within a 
group of individuals. Humans already treat technology much like humans, examples even 
including expressing politeness towards the machinery normally reserved for other humans 
(Nass, Fogg, & Moon, 1996). Making automation more similar to humans may result in the lines 
between human-human and human-machine interactions becoming more and more blurred, 
resulting in more interactions and possible emergent antagonistic effects leading to coupling and 
failures. It is also likely that as AI becomes more complex in its expression of emotions and 
responses via the human-computer interface, humans may begin to view AI as more human-like, 
something that will further contribute to the blurring of the lines between human-only social 
behaviors and human-automation social behaviors. For example, saying good morning to your 
personal automation assistant may become the accepted polite thing to do as these assistants 
begin to respond with more complex (simulated) human emotions. It may simply be that the 
software used in the present study was too simplistic and not complex enough to affect human 
trust which is built on a vastly more complicated social structure. Anthropomorphism, or when 
non-human entities are assigned human characteristics, can have powerful effects on the 
calibration of trust in an automation system. Specifically, humans may place too much trust in a 
system if they perceive it to share human qualities, and this incorrect calibration may result in the 
misuse of an automation system (Culley & Madhavan, 2013). This misuse can include increased 
trust in the automation when there are actually no increases in automation performance, and also 
can lead to increased dependence on the automation and increased perceptions of credibility of 
automation (Pak, Fink, Price, Bass, & Sturre, 2012). It may be that more complex or 
anthropomorphized automation will trigger more similarities to human trust, and create the 
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effects hypothesized in this study. Future studies can examine interactions with more human-like 
automation that models human behaviors, and this may be more likely to show overlap of human 
and automation trust. 
Additionally, the potential effect of role of the team member is of interest for future 
directions. Teams in this study were comprised of either the Scout or Firefighter, and each role 
had different responsibilities and exposure to the automation. It is possible that this could have 
influenced outcomes like trust of the automation and perception of reliability, as well as human 
trust. Future analyses are planned to address these questions appropriately, including using the 
Actor-Partner Interdependence Model technique to assess effects within the partnership (Kashy 
& Kenny, 2000). 
Conclusions 
 As automation technology increases in both complexity and usage, it becomes 
increasingly important to consider potential interactions between our human social structures and 
the characteristics of technology that humans assign to automation. The present research took the 
first steps into unexplored territory regarding this interaction and examined how human trust and 
trust in automation may interact. A number of unexpected outcomes were revealed. The 
interaction effects reported here indicate a sustained pattern of miscalibration of the trust of 
automation related to the level of trust in human partners under specific automation reliability 
conditions, and this warrants further research on possible detrimental impacts in real-world 
settings.   
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Table 1 
Summary of Demographics 
Demographic N Percent Mean SD 
Gender     
     Male 59 38.8   
     Female 93 61.2   
Race     
     Black or African-American 11 5.9   
     White 77 41.4   
     Asian 56 30.1   
     Other or more than one race 8 4.3   
Age   18.51 1.14 
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Table 2 
Participant Experimental Group Membership 
Group N Percent 
Friend, 70% 60 32.2 
Stranger, 70% 46 24.8 
Friend, 100% 44 23.6 
Stranger, 100%, Firefighter 36 19.4 
Combinations could consist of the following: Friend or Stranger groups, 70% or 100% 
reliability for a total of 186 participants 
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Table 3 
Reliabilities of Scales 
Group Mean SD Cronbach’s Alpha 
Perfect Automation Schema 2.59 .80 .70 
Propensity to Trust 2.61 .46 .68 
Intragroup Trust 4.38 .70 .89 
     Before Orientation 4.24 .77 .88 
     After Trial 4.48 .62 .89 
Trust in Automation 2.96 .81 .90 
Attribution of Blame    
          …to the automation 2.85 .96 .89 
          …to the partner 2.17 .69 .77 
          …to the self 2.80 .84 .79 
Attribution of Success    
          …to the automation 2.49 .86 .85 
          …to the partner 3.39 .85 .73 
          …to the self 3.02 .72 .65 
Thinking in percentages, how reliable would you say 
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Table 4 
Full survey items. 
 
Full survey items administered in the prescreen and before orientation. 
Perfect Automation Schema. 
Responses displayed for each statement: 
1 = Strongly Disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neither Disagree Nor Agree 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly Agree 
Statements: 
If an automated system makes an error, then it is broken. 
If an automated system makes a mistake, then it is completely useless. 
Only faulty automated systems provide imperfect results. 
 
Propensity to Trust. 
Responses displayed for each statement: 
1 = Strongly Disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neither Disagree Nor Agree 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly Agree 
Statements: 
One should be very cautious with strangers. (R) 
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Most experts tell the truth about the limits of their knowledge. 
Most people can be counted on to do what they say they will do. 
These days, you must be alert or someone is likely to take advantage of you. (R) 
Most salespeople are honest in describing their products. 
Most repair people will not overcharge people who are ignorant of their specialty. 
Most people answer public opinion polls honestly. 
Most adults are competent at their jobs. 
 
Intragroup Trust. 
Responses displayed for each statement: 
1 = Strongly Disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neither Disagree Nor Agree 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly Agree 
Statements: 
We absolutely respect each other’s competence. 
My team member present shows absolute integrity. 
We expect the complete truth from each other. 
We are certain that we can fully trust each other. 
We count on each other to fully live up to their word. 
 
Full survey items administered after each trial. 
Intragroup Trust. 
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See above. 
Trust in Automation. 
Responses displayed for each statement: 
1 = Strongly Disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neither Disagree Nor Agree 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly Agree 
The system is deceptive (R). 
The system behaves in an underhanded manner (R). 
I am suspicious of the system's intent, action, or output (R). 
I am wary of the system (R). 
The system's action will have a harmful or injurious outcome (R). 
I am confident in the system. 
The system provides security. 
The system has integrity. 
The system is dependable. 
The system is reliable. 
I can trust the system. 
I am familiar with the system. 
 
Attribution of Blame and Credit 
Responses displayed for each statement: 
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1 = Strongly Disagree 
2 = Disagree 
3 = Neither Disagree Nor Agree 
4 = Agree 
5 = Strongly Agree 
The automation was responsible for any errors that were made in the task. 
The automation was to blame for most of the problems that were encountered in accomplishing 
this task. 
Success on this task was largely due to the things the automation said or did. 
The automation should get credit for most of what was accomplished for this task. 
I was responsible for any errors that were made in this task. 
I was to blame for most of the problems that were encountered in accomplishing this task. 
Success on this task was largely due to the things I said or did. 
I should get credit for most of what was accomplished for this task. 
My team member was to blame for most of the problems that were encountered in accomplishing 
this task. 
My team member was responsible for any errors that were made in the task. 
The success on this task was largely due to the things my team member said or did. 
My team member should get credit for most of what was accomplished for this task. 
 
Perception of the Reliability of the Automation 
Responses displayed for each statement: 
0% = 1 
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10% = 2 
20% = 3 
30% = 4 
40% = 5 
50% = 6 
60% = 7 
70% = 8 
80% = 9 
90% = 10 
100% = 11 
Thinking in percentages, how reliable would you say WAA was? WAA was correct ____% of 
the time today.  
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Table 5 
Intraclass Correlations for Outcome Measures and Partner Correlations 
 ICC F r 
Perception of Automation’s Reliability .04 1.08 .03 
Partner Trust Before Orientation .59 3.84* .58* 
Partner Trust After Trial .15 1.35 .14 
Trust in Automation After Trial .21 1.52* .21* 
Blame Assigned to Automation After Trial .28 1.79* .28* 
Success Due to Automation After Trial .02 1.03 .04 
Blame Assigned to Self After Trial .01 1.01 -.02 
Success Due to Self After Trial .14 1.31 .15 
Blame Assigned to Partner After Trial .02 1.05 -.05 





Descriptive statistics and correlations for individual-level measures and the one team-level measure 
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Perfect Automation Schema 2.60 .80 - -.11 -.08 -.24 -.11 .04 .05 -.06 .09 .09 -.01 -.03 -.07 
2. Propensity to Trust 2.61 .46 -.11 - .08 .07 .01 -.03 -.04 .20 .01 .06 .01 -.03 .05 
3. Before Orientation Trust 4.24 .77 -.08 .08 - .55 .07 -.06 -.04 .11 -.09 -.03 .13 .05 -.06 
4. After Trial Trust 4.48 .62 -.24 .07 .55 - .09 -.10 -.08 .06 -.12 -.25 .12 .03 -.01 
5. Trust in Automation 2.96 .81 -.11 .01 .07 .09 - -.52 .27 .19 .10 -.04 -.02 .60 .16 
6. Blame of Automation 2.85 .96 .04 -.03 -.06 -.10 -.53 - -.02 -.25 .07 -.03 .12 -.27 -.12 
7. Success due to Automation 2.49 .86 .05 -.04 -.04 -.08 .27 -.02 - .18 -.03 .08 -.05 .26 .12 
8. Blame due to Self 2.80 .84 -.06 .20 .11 .06 .19 -.25 .18 - .15 .08 .26 .13 -.10 
9. Success due to Self 2.80 .72 .09 .01 -.09 -.12 .10 .07 -.03 .15 - .28 .23 .01 .21* 
10. Blame due to Partner 2.17 .69 .09 .06 -.03 -.25 -.04 -.03 .08 .08 .28 - -.23 .03 -.15 
11. Success due to Partner 3.39 .85 -.01 .01 .13 .12 -.02 .12 -.05 .26 .23 -.23 - -.06 .12 
12. Perceived Reliability 6.82 2.35 -.03 -.03 .05 .03 .60 -.27 .26 .13 .01 .03 -.06 - .11 
13. Team Performance 64.64 29.92 -.07 .05 -.06 -.01 .16 -.12 .12 -.10 .21* -.15 .12 .11 - 
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Table 7 
Summary of Intercept Only Models for Outcome Variables 
 Estimate Intercept Variance Residual Variance 
Partner Trust 4.38* 0.06 0.42 
Automation Trust 3.07* 0.09 0.27 
Perceived Reliability 6.82* 0.05 5.47 
Blame of Self 2.80* 0.03 0.68 
Success due to Automation 2.49* 0.02 0.73 
* p < .05 
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Table 8 
Team Gender Composition by Experimental Condition 
Group Total N Reliability Condition Trust Condition 
  70% 100% Friends Strangers 
All Female 24 10 14 11 13 
All Male 15 11 4 6 9 
Mixed-Gender 22 10 12 9 13 
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Table 9 
Group differences for Figure 6 Interaction, Hypothesis 4c 
Pair t-value p-value 
(1) and (2) 2.082 0.039* 
(1) and (3) 2.321 0.021* 
(1) and (4) -0.653 0.515 
(2) and (3) -0.072 0.943 
(2) and (4) -1.979 0.049* 
(3) and (4) -2.051 0.042* 
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Figure 1. Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) model of trust and related antecedents and 
outcomes.  




Figure 2. Lee and See’s (2004) representation of user trust and automation capabilities.  





























 70% Reliability 100% Reliability 
Strangers 
 
Group 4 Group 3 
Friends 
 
Group 2 Group 1 
 
Figure 4. Experimental design layout with relationships teams and reliability of automation 
teams.  
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Figure 5. NFC layout with warning example highlighted within red box 
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Figure 6. Three-way interaction between Trust Condition, Reliability Condition, and PAS. Green 
circles indicate more accurate perceptions and red circles indicate less accurate perceptions. 
Each of the four possible experiment combinations are represented in separate boxes, with 
Perception of Reliability along all Y-axes and Perfect Automation Schema (centered) on all X-
axes. Actual reliability of the automation is marked with a red line. Perception of Reliability was 
coded at 1 = 0%, 2 = 10%, etc. For the purposes of the reliability conditions, the 70% reliability 
level is marked at 8 (coded for 70%) and the 100% reliability level is marked just under 11 
(coded for 100%) for the sake of visibility and graph literacy. 
Participants with Friends 
100% Reliability 
Participants with Strangers 
100% Reliability 
Participants with Strangers 
70% Reliability 
Participants with Friends 
70% Reliability 
